

FARC'S INFLUENCE IN BRAZIL

A Monograph

by

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ABSTRACT

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Colombia is one of 10 countries which is bordered by Brazil. Colombia also presents the highest risk to Brazilian sovereignty due to the presence of the largest drug trafficker and guerrilla group on the American continent, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In addition, the region is located in the Amazon forest, one of the richest and most coveted biomes on the planet.

The guerrilla organization that was born nearly half a century has undergone periods of growth and weakening, but currently still has the capacity to carry out effective direct or indirect actions. These actions can be characterized as risks to the sovereignty of the countries surrounding Colombia, including Brazil. The FARC can impose many potential threats on Brazilian sovereignty in the Amazonia as well as the entire territory. These threats include drug trafficking, recruiting people of the region to FARC's cause, weapons trafficking, occupying Brazilian territory to install training bases, and deep relationships with authorities at the highest levels of power. Analyzing the potential of these threats may be conducive to improving the ongoing Brazilian government policy, and consequentially the operational role of the Brazilian Army and its contribution to achieving the strategic goal of maintaining untouchable Brazilian sovereignty.

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ACRONYMS

FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces
SIPAM	Amazon Protection System
SIVAM	Amazon Surveillance System

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INTRODUCTION

A country with a landmass of 8,514,876 sq. km., Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world taking into consideration discontinuous lands. Located in the east central portion of South America, its territory also includes 55,455 sq. km. of water. Most of the territory is suitable for human habitation, with no deserts or high mountainous regions. Brazil is 23,086 km. long from its perimeter, 7,367 km. of its coastline borders on the Atlantic Ocean, and 15,719 km.

(approximately 10,000 miles) of the coastline borders its neighbors.¹ It shares a border with all South American countries except Chile, Ecuador and Trinidad Tobago. It is worth emphasizing that there are no border disputes between Brazil and any of its neighbors. Although there are no issues for trafficability through the country, the Amazon region certainly presents some natural challenges to a normal lifestyle when compared with other regions. In that region, Brazil shares 1,644 km. of the border with Colombia. Of all countries which border Brazil, Colombia poses the highest risk to Brazilian sovereignty. This risk is the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionárias de Colombia, the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC).

Colombia has been waging war against insurgents since 1962, and against the FARC insurgency since 1966. Counterinsurgency strategy in Colombia has evolved from originally treating guerrillas as bandits to finally a more military, security-oriented strategy. The lack of a coordinated counterinsurgency strategy allowed the FARC to gradually grow in weapons and capabilities, to the point that, in 2002, the population perceived it as a real threat to Colombian security and the government. However, that year the government developed and executed a successful counterinsurgency strategy. Even though the Colombian strategy has reduced the FARC's capacity to threaten the Colombian government, the insurgency continues to represent a

¹Colegioweb.com, "Características Gerais do Espaço Brasileiro," <http://www.colegioweb.com.br/geografia/caracteristicas-gerais-do-espaco-brasileiro.html> (accessed 31 January 2013).

threat to the sovereignty of countries around Colombia, among them Brazil. Indeed, several incidents between the Brazilian Army and the insurgents testify to this threat. The more pressure the FARC undergoes within Colombia, the greater the probability is that the group will launch external acts to seek sanctuaries or different sources for resupply, which would destabilize neighboring countries. The FARC's potential range of actions includes attacks against political, economic, social, or military targets. Therefore, taken as a matter to be analyzed in this work, a closer examination of this potential threat to Brazilian security suggests there are several indicators pointing to potential threats to Brazilian sovereignty in the border region and inside the country. In addition, the results of the research may yield potential ideas for ongoing operations and strategy for the Brazilian Army, which may lead to more effectiveness in attaining the fundamental objectives of the Brazilian State, more specifically sovereignty and national patrimony integrity.²

Background

The FARC's emergence in Colombia has not occurred by chance, rather, it was a consequence of a series of political events that marked the country, especially during the second half of the twentieth century. In order to understand the reason for the increase in violence and the emergence of the guerrilla in Colombia, it is necessary to review the political forces which dominated Colombia during the period preceding the onset of the FARC.

After Colombia's independence from Spain in 1813, two major parties began to dominate the political scene in the country: the Liberal party and the Conservative party. The first party

²Escola Superior de Guerra, "Elementos Fundamentais," 2009, Rio de Janeiro, <http://www.esg.br/uploads/2011/01/Manual-Básico-Vol-I.pdf> (accessed 31 January 2013), Section 1.4.2.3.

originated from followers of Simon Bolívar and the second one from followers of Santander.³ Since then, the two parties have taken turns in power.⁴ At the beginning of the last century, labor unions influenced by the revolutionary events that occurred in Russia, arose in Colombia. Such unionization was motivated by both the financial crisis and the violent repression of the Colombian government, consequently, giving birth to the Communist Party of Colombia in 1930.⁵ After the emergence of the CCP (Colombian Communist Party), Colombia held one more political ideological force to influence political decisions in the country.⁶

On 9 April 1948, under the conservative government, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a very popular liberal leader, was murdered.⁷ This incident triggered one of the most extraordinary moments of violence in Colombia. Due to the popularity Gaitán enjoyed among the leading liberal population, his death set off a popular uprising of enormous proportions. Initially, Bogotá became a battleground among liberals and conservatives, but later the conflict was spread throughout the country, causing thousands of deaths among conservatives and liberals.⁸ In the

³Banco de la República, “Historia de los partidos,” <http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/ayudadetareas/poli/poli61.htm> (accessed 4 February 2013).

⁴Dennis M., Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, *Colombia a Country Study* (Washington D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), 300-307.

⁵Eduardo Pizarro and Ricardo Peñaranda, *Las FARC 1949-1966: de la autodefensa a la combinación de todas las formas de lucha* (Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1991), 30–38.

⁶*Ibid.*, 40.

⁷Jorge Eliecer Gaitán Ayala (1903–1948).

⁸Britannica, “La Violencia, Dictatorship, and Democratization,” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/126016/Colombia/25342/La-Violencia-dictatorship-and-democratic-restoration> (accessed 4 February 2013).

countryside, groups of bandits organized themselves under the banner of the Liberal Party. One of their leaders, Manuel Marulanda Velez or “Tirofijo,” would later create the FARC.⁹

Between 1949 and 1958, Colombia went through a phase of attempted appeasement by negotiating with radical groups under General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s government.¹⁰ But an unfavorable social ambience generated violence, and in the midst of the negotiating process, the government allowed death squads to eliminate top leaders of underground groups.¹¹ At the same time and in parallel to the spread of violence, the CCP was declared illegal in Colombia and started operating in secrecy and greatly influencing different regions of Colombia.

Radical groups, which were concealed in less populated areas, attracted many men and women who were dissatisfied with the established government. These civilians were included in the first armed groups in Colombia under the CCP’s discourse. A group of bandits concealed in Marquetalia and led by Manuel Marulanda, started to prepare a 48-man group for the armed struggle.¹² In 1964, the Colombian government confronted this by attacking Marquetalia, an unprecedented type of guerrilla group. Despite the large number of troops that the Colombian Army employed in the operation, Marulanda and his gang managed to escape. In 1964 following the attack in Marquetalia, Marulanda and their followers gathered in the jungle and officially created the so-called “Bloque Sur” during their first conference.¹³ They adopted the name of the

⁹Pedro Antonio Marin Velez (1930–2008) assumed the nom de guerre Manuel Marulanda Velez.

¹⁰Pizarro and Peñaranda, 30–38.

¹¹Ibid., 40.

¹²Resistencia Colombiana, “Diario de la Resistencia de Marquetalia,” <http://www.resistencia-colombia.org/pdf/diario-marquetalia.pdf> (accessed 4 February 2013).

¹³The location of the Conference was in the Caldas state. “Chronology of Resistance: FARC-EP, a History of Struggle,” http://www.resistencia-colombia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=463:chronology-of-resistance-farc-ep-a-history-of-struggle&catid=50&Itemid=85 (accessed 7 November 2012).

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia with the aim of ending their so-called “bandits and robbers” reputation.¹⁴

After their first conference, the FARC became better organized and held other conferences in order to examine the fate of the organization. Five other conferences with roots in the communist movement took place in 1966, 1969, 1971, 1974, and 1978. In order to enlarge the territory under their control, they defined new areas of operation, including the border with Brazil. It is worth mentioning that during the sixth FARC conference in 1978, they agreed to use a border area with Peru and Brazil to expand their activities, especially obtaining weapons and other supplies for the guerrillas.

Until the 1980s the FARC were small in numbers, around 1,000 to 3,000 men, and their strategy was not well defined.¹⁵ But in 1982, when their seventh conference took place, the guerrilla group established a strategy of political struggle and armed fight with the aim of seizing power. This strategy became their political end state. In 1984, the FARC signed a ceasefire agreement with the government, integrating the civilian opposition and creating a new movement in the country, the Patriotic Union (PU). This agreement did not succeed, however, due to the ongoing violence. In the 1980s since the guerrilla group still lacked a source of funds to conduct their activities, they approached drug traffickers. With the fall of communism in 1990, such an approach became even more pronounced. Because the FARC lost their political power, they began to seek more resources by creating the "revolutionary tax," a sort of illegal collection

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Jesus M. La Rotta, *Las Finanzas de la Subversión Colombiana* (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Los Últimos Patriotas, 1996), 94.

among the population. Proceeds coming from drug trafficking were used for acquisition of modern, sophisticated weaponry in addition to ammunition and other supplies.¹⁶

During this period, the FARC gave up their political and ideological bias and became a de facto narco-guerrilla organization. Due to the high profits that the production and sale of drugs provided, the guerrilla group gradually moved from being tax collectors to being drug traffickers. During the 1990s, despite the opposition from Ernesto Samper's liberal government, the guerrillas managed to control a significant portion of the country. In 1991, a FARC attack took place on a Brazilian border platoon, which left three soldiers dead and four wounded.¹⁷ From this point on Brazil began to realize the situation also involved the Brazilian sovereignty. FARC's control of territory reached its peak at the end of 1998, during the government of Andrés Pastrana, when the government granted the FARC an area equivalent to the size of Holland.¹⁸ By taking advantage of this concession, the FARC had the opportunity to increase their staff and improve equipment and training.¹⁹ Money and manpower gave the FARC the ability to seize cities, kidnap politicians, erect illegal roadblocks across the country, and destroy platoon and company-sized military units.²⁰

¹⁶Ibid., 89–90.

¹⁷Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, "Guerrilla in The Brazilian Amazon," FMSO, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/amazon/amazon.htm> (accessed 6 January 2013).

¹⁸Andres Pastrana Arango (b.1954) President of Colombia from 1998–2002.

¹⁹Colombian Government, "National Development Plan," [dnp.gov.co](http://www.dnp.gov.co). <http://www.dnp.gov.co/PortalWeb/Portals/0/archivos/documentos/GCRP/PND/PND.pdf> (accessed 24 September 2012).

²⁰For example Mitu, the Capital of the Vaupes department (state), was attacked and seized by the FARC in the morning on 1 November 1998. At that time the city had approximately 15,000 inhabitants. El tiempo digital. "Sección justicia, El billar." El tiempo.com. <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4129924> (accessed 26 August 2012).

In 1999, an offensive action mobilized approximately 12,000 guerrillas who tried to occupy 28 Colombian cities, among them the capital Bogotá. The Colombian Army repressed the insurgents who arrived at the entrance of the capital. At the beginning of this period, the guerrillas had around 18,000 men and occupied approximately 40 percent of the Colombian territory, a reflection of their growth that occurred in the late 1990s.²¹ In 2002, Álvaro Uribe assumed the presidency of the Colombian government, and supported financially by the United States (U.S.), started an actual war against drug trafficking.²² Over the years, he gradually reduced the power and effectiveness of the guerrillas. In 2005 the FARC had around 13,000 men and by 2008 there were approximately only 8,000 men.

By the end of 2006, as a result of the implementation of the first period of DSDP (Democratic Security and Defense Policy), the security improved, the government increased control of the territory, and criminal indicators had dropped sharply.²³ For instance, from 2002 to 2006, kidnapping incidents decreased from 2,882 to 600; and terrorist attacks from 1,645 to 646.²⁴ As a consequence, Alvaro Uribe won reelection in 2006.

In spite of the great efforts by the Colombian government in the last ten years, today the FARC continues to be a threat to the security of Colombian and other neighboring countries. In Brazil's case, it has enough capacity to overcome FARC's threat within the country's borders, but it depends on the political will of Brazilian politicians. Both the governments of Colombia and

²¹Colombian Government, "National Development Plan."

²²Alvaro Uribe Velez (b.1952), President of Colombia from 2002–2010.

²³José R. Perdomo, "Colombia's Democratic Security Defense Policy in the Demobilization of Paramilitaries," <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA468861> (accessed 7 November 2012).

²⁴Ministério de Defesa de Colombia, "Resultados política de seguridad democrática" http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios%20sectoriales/info_estadistica/Logros%20de%20Politica%20CSD%20Junio%202010.pdf (accessed 27 August 2012).

Brazil have ample interest in facing the problem. As Brazil addresses this threat, international and internal pressures will influence the measures adopted by the Brazilian government.

This study is limited to the political and military aspects, and includes some historical cases from 1990 to the present. However, it will analyze the events of the last 10 years in great depth, particularly the period of time since the Workers' Party came to power in Brazil in 2002. The study will suggest recommendations to the ongoing Brazilian policy for the protection of the Amazon region as well as for the strategy of the employment of Brazilian forces in this region.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In identifying the political and military factors of the FARC's influence upon Brazil, a brief review of literature is necessary. Four key authors have written extensively on topics related to this theme. In addition to them helping set the stage for the examinations, their views also support the analysis to determine the extent of the FARC's continued threat to Brazil.

Colonel Luis Alberto Villmarín Pulido is a diligent researcher of the phenomenon of violence and its sociopolitical outline in Colombia.²⁵ The views and conclusions expressed by Colonel Pulido are the result of lengthy reflections of an expert in counterinsurgency operations in rural area, military intelligence, and psychological operations. In 1997, Pulido concentrated on the connections between the FARC and narcoterrorists in Brazil in his *FARC: terrorismo na América do Sul [FARC – Terrorism in South America]*.²⁶ Documents seized from groups associated with Manuel Marulanda-Tiروفijo described how these groups in both countries developed their activities. The author discusses in great detail the history and evolution of the FARC and establishes them as a communist group based on their motivation and how they intend to seize the power in Colombia.²⁷ Pulido also examines the connections between the FARC and socialist governments in Latin America and South America, among them Brazil, as well as their traditional links with organizations like Sendero Luminoso (Enlightening Path) in Peru.²⁸

²⁵Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido is a retired Colombian Army colonel with 25 years of military experience, more than half of them engaged in combat operations against terrorist groups in that country. He has written 18 books and over 400 articles related to the complex Colombian conflict, international terrorism and national history. Colonel Pulido is also a member of the Bolivarian Society of History, Academy of History of Huila, and the Colombian Academy of Military History.

²⁶Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido, *FARC, Terrorismo na América do Sul* (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2009), 208.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 169.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 206.

In *El Cartel de las FARC [The Cartel of the FARC]*, Pulido describes how the guerrillas conduct drug trafficking in the border region.²⁹ In the section “La Frontera Caliente de Brasil” [“The Hot Border with Brazil”], Pulido points out the Amazon forest as one of the most important places in the production, processing, and shipping of cocaine for the U.S., Japan, and the European Union.³⁰ In addition, he confirms that the guerrillas established themselves in the region decades ago and therefore, know the Amazon jungle very well. They supply themselves with food and medicine from Tabatinga and Benjamin Constant, cities located in Brazilian territory.³¹ These guerrillas are located in the Colombian departments of Amazonas, Vaupés, Putumayo, and Caquetá, all of them bordering Brazil.

In his third and most recent published work *Complot contra Colombia, Secretos de los Computadores de Raúl Reyes [Complot against Colombia, Secrecies of Raúl Reyes’ Computers]*, Pulido goes deep, describing all of the contents of the seized computer of Raúl Reyes, head of the FARC’s urban militias, who was arrested in a successful incursion in his camp by Colombian troops of Omega Task Force in 2007.³² Besides compromising information directly linking Latin American rulers with the FARC, several Brazilian names were discovered in the computer, including the former president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.³³ In the “Brazilian Dossier,” Pulido describes in detail friendly relations with Brazilian authorities through e-mails sent from Raul Reyes to five ministers, a procurator general, a special assessor of President Lula, a vice

²⁹Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, *El Cartel de Las FARC* (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, 2009), 5.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 116.

³¹*Ibid.*, 117.

³²Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, *Complot contra Colombia – Secretos de los computadores de Raul Reyes* (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, 2009), 4.

³³*Ibid.*, 183.

minister, five deputies, and a judge.³⁴ At the end of September 2012, the Federal Supreme Court convicted one of those ministers, José Dirceu, for money laundering, passive and active corruption, and as the ringleader of a plot to divert public funds into politicians' hands.³⁵ According to Pulido, Brazilian political analysts' investigations show that for several years there has been a substantial communist infiltration into key echelons of the Brazilian Air Force's command. He also mentions that Raúl Reyes facilitated President Lula's reelection.³⁶ However there is no mention of an answer from President Lula. Pulido relates details on the Olivério Medina investigation conducted by Brazilian authorities. In 2007, former priest and terrorist Francisco Cadena alias Olivério Medina was arrested in Brazil.³⁷ In Colombia he was convicted of several crimes including terrorist operations and various murders. However, due to contacts with some officials in key positions in the Brazilian government, the judiciary denied Olivério Medina's extradition and he received the status of political refugee.³⁸

Pulido's opinion regarding Brazilian behavior and its point of view of the FARC is one of complete disapproval. The colonel criticizes Brazil's behavior as misrule due to their failure to develop a sustained military campaign along the border with Colombia to destroy several guerrilla camps within the Amazon jungle in Brazil, failure to cut the ties of the Brazilian drug

³⁴Pulido, *Complot contra Colombia*, 184.

³⁵Guilherme Portanova and Geize Duarte, "Mensalão: José Dirceu e mais sete são condenados por corrupção ativa," Globo.com, <http://g1.globo.com/bom-dia-brasil/noticia/2012/10/mensalao-jose-dirceu-e-mais-sete-sao-condenados-por-corrupcao-ativa.html> (accessed 11 October 2012).

³⁶Pulido, *Complot contra Colombia*, 185.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 186.

³⁸El 'dossier' brasileño, "Fórum Realidade." <http://realidade.org/forum/index.php?topic=24740.0> (accessed 12 October 2012).

traffickers with Colombian terrorists, and failure to deport many propagandists of the FARC who move comfortably in both universities and the halls of government institutions in Brazil.³⁹

Retired Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro is one of the most important theorists of terrorism in South America.⁴⁰ In the 1990s, as colonel and commander of Brazilian 1st Special Forces Battalion, he headed a special operation task force in engagements along the Traíra River on the border between Brazil and Colombia, to destroy a FARC front known as the Simón Bolívar Command. In “Narcoterrorism in Latin America, A Brazilian Perspective,” Pinheiro demonstrates that the narcoterrorism led by the FARC is a serious threat that deserves the immediate attention of both Brazil and the U.S. He argues that this fight is an incessant battle and will require constant investment in equipment, intelligence, and personnel with all of those assets under an integrated international cooperation. In this regard, he is not talking about Colombia specifically, but he highlights a special concern required from the Brazilian government. Pinheiro also describes some measures that Brazil has been adopting in order to transform strategic concerns into practical activities.

Pinheiro’s thoughts are not only related to modern times. In his article, “A Vision of the Brazilian National Security Policy on the Amazon,” he suggests this menace developed after the

³⁹Jorge Serrao, “Coronel colombiano denuncia infiltração das FARC na FAB e insiste em ligações da guerrilha com governo Lula.” Alerta Total. <http://www.alertatotal.net/2009/02/coronel-colombiano-denuncia-infiltracao.html> (accessed 20 September 2012).

⁴⁰From June 1994 to June 1996, then Col Alvaro was the Brazilian Army liaison officer in the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. During this period, he was instructor in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and a consultant of the Brazilian edition of the magazine *Military Review*. Since 2005 he has been a nonresident analyst nonresident of the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), an institution of the highest level of the Military Professional Education System of the U.S. Special Operations Command (U.S. SOCOM). Along with his works published by that institution, MG Alvaro participates in seminars, conferences, and strategic studies. Some of his works include “Narcoterrorism in Latin America: the Brazilian Perspective” and “Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight Against Crime Urban Guerrillas”.

FARC reestablished new ways of raising funds after the collapse of communism in 1989.⁴¹ FARC had previously been considered a politico-ideological group. With their new deep connections in drug trafficking, they began to exploit their influence outside the Colombian territory. At the same time, Brazil and other South American countries became enroutes for exporting drugs. To obviate this new problem, Brazil implemented the Calha Norte Project (North Path Project) as an important strategy to secure the Amazon region.⁴²

In his article entitled “Prevenção e Combate ao Terrorismo no Século XXI” [“Preventing and Combating Terrorism in the 21st Century”], Pinheiro noted that the FARC have established connections throughout Latin America, the U.S., and Canada.⁴³ The group lost its revolutionary identity and became one of the most powerful drug cartels in the world. He also describes a dangerous relationship between the producers of drugs in Colombia and weapons traders in Brazil. Pinheiro also affirms that the international community uses the term narcoterrorism to characterize activities directly or indirectly linked to the cultivation, production, transportation, and distribution of illicit drugs. The term is also applied to organizations that use this business to fund terrorist activities.⁴⁴

Finally, in “Os Riscos Impostos pelas FARC para a Soberania Brasileira na Amazônia” [“Risks Imposed by the FARC upon the Brazilian Sovereignty in the Amazonia”], Major Robert Maciel de Souza argues that among the 10 countries bordering Brazil, Colombia is the one that

⁴¹Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, “A Vision of the Brazilian National Security Policy on the Amazon,” Foreign Military Studies Office, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/vision.html> (accessed 20 February 2013).

⁴² Calha Norte Project will be explained in detail in the “Brazilian National Policy” section of the paper.

⁴³Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, “A prevenção e o combate ao terrorismo,” Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército. <http://www.eme.eb.mil.br/ceeex/artigos> (accessed on 6 November 2012).

⁴⁴Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, “O Narcoterrorismo na América Latina.” UNODOC. <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/brazil/narcotraf.pdf>. (accessed 6 November 2012), 24.

poses the highest risk to Brazilian sovereignty because of the presence of the FARC.⁴⁵

Throughout their history, the FARC have undergone periods of growth and reduction. However, their capacity to carry out direct and indirect actions poses a risk to Brazilian sovereignty. There is even more concern regarding the Amazon region because of its occupation by the FARC. This area has been used by the FARC for concealment and sanctuary in order to concentrate on their illegal activities with drugs.⁴⁶ Since Brazil and Colombia share a large portion of the Amazon and it is extremely difficult to control boundaries in that region, the guerrillas enjoy extensive freedom of action to cross the borders into and out of Brazil. Souza points out that acquiring weapons and ammunition for military actions in Colombia are some of the FARC activities in Brazilian territory.⁴⁷

RESEARCH DESIGN

This paper is an exploratory study with the purpose of identifying to what extent the FARC represents a threat to Brazilian sovereignty regarding the political and military realms. To answer that question the research will use both qualitative and quantitative data. The research will examine official and unofficial documents, books on this subject, surveys, official statistics, and Non-Government Organizations (NGO) statistics. The analysis of all these documents and the comparison between them will lead to fulfilling the goal of the research. The result will facilitate the evaluation of the current situation concerning the awareness of Brazilian authorities responsible for focusing on this issue. Also it will allow attention to be directed to some public

⁴⁵Robert Maciel de Souza, "Os Riscos Impostos pelas FARC para a Soberania Brasileira na Amazônia," (Post graduation thesis, Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2010), 6.

⁴⁶Ibid., 36.

⁴⁷Ibid., 40.

initiatives of the Brazilian government, and within this realm, implications for the Brazilian Army. The research will analyze the FARC's influence on Brazil in three parts as follows.

The first part of the research will analyze the FARC's strategic approach against the Colombian government, its evolution throughout time, and the current modus operandi of profiting from drug trafficking and terrorism within Colombia and abroad. This part will have two purposes: to validate FARC's strategic approach to changing the Colombian political system and understanding the Colombian government's strategy against them; and to assess the dimension of connections between the FARC and Brazilian players. To that end, the research will depict the command structure and show how the FARC dominate a large portion of Colombian territory and conduct their activities of drug trade in Colombia. Following that, the work will present how FARC's activities begin to bring about change in Brazil by pointing out a historical sequence of contacts between the FARC and the Brazilian Armed Forces. Also this section will show the political bonds between FARC leaders and Brazilian political parties, as well as the repercussions to Brazil. The overall objective of this section is to determine the growth of FARC abilities to adapt their business outside the Colombian territory once the internal efforts of the Colombian government succeed. This will help later when analyzing the extent to which the mere existence of FARC has the ability to influence political decisions of the governments in South America.

The second part of the research will analyze Brazil's position in facing the threat posed by the FARC. This will be covered in five sections. First, the Amazon region will be examined in order to geographically characterize this special environment. This section will also depict the structure of the Armed Forces in that region and the challenges faced in defending large areas of borders. The research will analyze the reaction of the Brazilian government, particularly the Army, as it relates to the movements of the FARC previously outlined.

Second, an assessment will be made of the implementation of technological support in order to improve the effectiveness of surveillance and the protection of borders. An analysis will be made of the how the government defense policy is applied and which factors will be fundamental for its success.

Third, analysis will be made of the performance of the Brazilian Army in dealing with a different type of employment, that of combating drug traffic and other illicit activities on the borderline. It will analyze the relationship with the Brazilian Federal Police in that area, an important player who has the appropriate training necessary to carry out this type of operation. The purpose of this part is to analyze the gaps in the current procedures of these entities once they are working together, and point out initiatives that have been successful and may lead towards better results. The fourth part will present the Brazilian legal framework which imposes restraints and constraints when the Brazilian Army is executing this type of operation. The final part of this section will depict the terrorist threat by the FARC towards Brazil by pointing out some characteristics of FARC's terrorist activity, their link with international terrorist groups, and its impact on Brazil.

Finally, the research will compile all of the above to conclude which political military vectors transform the FARC into a threat to Brazilian sovereignty, which represent real, potential noteworthy factors for political and military decision makers in Brazil. In conclusion, recommendations will be made in order to improve the Brazilian strategy for defense of the Amazon, and future areas for research on the subject will be suggested.

THE FARC

According to the Colombian Armed Forces Command, the command of the FARC, known as secretariat consisted of nine political and military figures: ⁴⁸

⁴⁸El Universo, "Composición Actual del Secretariado de las FARC," ElUniverso.com,

1. Manuel Marulanda Vélez, "Tirifijo," commander in chief and founder of the FARC, who died in May 2008 from a heart attack.
2. Raúl Reyes, traditional spokesman of the FARC and considered the number two in the organization, killed in March 2008.
3. Jorge Briceno Suarez, alias "Mono Jojoy" regarded by the government as the commander of the organization.
4. Timoleón Jiménez, known as "Timoshenko" although his real name is Rodrigo Londoño, is the current commander of the FARC after Alfonso Cano's death and also seen as the head of guerrilla intelligence and counterintelligence.
5. Alfonso Cano, whose real name was Guillermo León Sáenz. He was a student activist and member of the Young Communist League. Regarded as one of the main ideologues and politicians of the FARC because of his education level, he participated in the failed peace talks in Caracas and Mexico between 1991 and 1992. Cano took over as top commander in May 2008, after the death of Marulanda. Colombian Armed Forces killed him in November 2011.
6. Iván Márquez, his real name is Luciano Marín. In late 2007 he appeared in Caracas along with the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez at the time when the Colombian government sought the release of a group of hostages held by the FARC, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. Intelligence and security agencies of Colombia believe that he is taking refuge in Venezuela, but Chávez's government denies it. He is also the leader of Northwest Block.
7. Iván Ríos, former head of the Central Block, murdered by a subordinate in March 2008. Mauricio Jaramillo, "el Médico," replaced him.

8. Joaquín Gómez, alias "Usuriaga" whose real name is Milton Toncel Jesús. He is an agronomist who graduated from a Russian university. Before joining the guerrillas he was a teacher. Gómez is a quiet person and was part of a negotiating committee in the failed peace talks between the FARC and the government of former President Andrés Pastrana. He was appointed as a member of the council in March 2008 replacing Raúl Reyes. He is also responsible for the South Block.
9. Jorge Briceño Suárez, known as "Mono Jojoy," was considered the military leader of the FARC and was accused of driving dozens of attacks on towns and barracks of the armed forces. He died in a bombing in a jungle area in the south in September 2010.

On 2 April 1993, the insurgency held its eighth conference with the purpose of revising the strategic plan outlined in 1982, and designing a new strategic plan for seizing power. As a subversive organization governed by Marxism-Leninism whose ultimate goal is the violent seizure of political power to impose a dictatorship similar to that of Cuba, the FARC have internal regulations and act in accordance with procedures assessed according to the criteria of scientific socialism and Machiavellian theory which affirms that the end justifies the means. In addition to the ultimate goal, the FARC's strategic plan established milestones and determined defined courses of action for each procedure, adhered to the collective decisions of the "central staff" and tactical plans for each block fronts.⁴⁹ The main conclusions include increasing the number of the FARC staff members to 25 and the secretariat to seven principals and seven replacements (see figure 1).⁵⁰ The conference approved the FARC proposal for a government of

⁴⁹Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, "Plan Estratégico de Las FARC," *Eltiempo.com*, http://www.eltiempo.com/blogs/analisis_del_conflicto_colombiano/2007/07/Plan-estrategico-de-las-Farc-I.php (accessed 31 January 2013).

⁵⁰The FARC strategic plan considered the Colombian east cordillera as the center of its strategic deployment. The reason for this was that the main Colombian cities are located along that cordillera. The purpose of this strategy was to take control of these cities in preparation for

national reconciliation and reconstruction, and reassured the FARC commitment to its agrarian program, which declares the large state eradication as an essential element.

After several deaths of the FARC's most important leaders along with years of combat, the current composition of the Secretariat is the following:⁵¹

1. Timoleón Jiménez, "Timoshenko" is the current commander after replacing Alfonso Cano.⁵²
2. Iván Márquez.
3. Joaquín Gómez.
4. Pablo Catatumbo whose real name is Jorge Torres Victoria. He directs several guerrilla columns that are present in mountainous areas of the Southwest. He joined the Secretariat to occupy the space left vacant after the death of Marulanda.
5. Mauricio Jaramillo, "El Médico." His headquarters is the jungle area of southern Colombia. The Marulanda's health care was his responsibility. He joined the Secretariat by replacing Iván Ríos.
6. Pastor Alape, whose real name is Felix Antonio Muñoz. He served as commander of the Middle Magdalena Block which operates in a wide region of central Colombia. The U.S. government accuses him of being the supervisor of the entire supply of cocaine in the Middle Magdalena and of implementing drug policy in the FARC to control the production, processing and distribution of hundreds of tons of narcotics.⁵³

the general offensive to seize power. The achievement of this purpose would facilitate the FARC in beginning to create the urban fronts.

⁵¹Currently there is one vacancy in the seven-seat composition of Secretariat.

⁵²Las Noticias de Mexico, "Las FARC reestructuran su cúpula para llenar el vacío dejado por 'Tirofijo'," <http://www.lasnoticiasmexico.com/121638.html> (accessed 10 October 2012).

⁵³Magdalena River.

He was appointed as a member of the Secretariat on 27 September 2010 after the death of Mono Jojoy.⁵⁴




Figure 1. Reorganization of the FARC after Eighth Conference

Source: Col Juvenal Diaz Mateus, “Democratic Security and Defense Policy: A Successful Counterinsurgency Model,” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2012), 46.

Despite currently being partially modified following several Colombian Armed Forces attacks that killed most of secretariat members and main leaders, the FARC were originally designed as follows:

1. The Central Staff, also known as secretariat, being the supreme organ of direction and command of the FARC.
2. Block, a great strategic unit for management and control of territory. The country was divided into seven blocks, each of which is divided into 5 or more fronts.
3. Front, composed of 50 to 500 men who control a particular area.
4. Column, considered a broad front.

⁵⁴El Universo.

5. Company, approximately 50 men who remain together for actions such as ambushes and surprise attacks.
6. Guerrilla, consisting of two platoons.
7. Platoon, the basic unit, consisting of 12 guerrillas.⁵⁵

In addition to the reorganization of the staff and the secretariat the FARC reorganized the geographical areas for the seven fronts they have at that time (see figure 2).




Figure 2. FARC Areas of Responsibility after Eighth Conference

Source: MAGELAN Maps.com, "Colombian Political Wall Map," <http://www.businesscol.com/comunidad/colombia/colombia0.5html> (accessed 22 November 2012). Subdivisions provided by Colombian Army Staff College.

⁵⁵There are no significant changes related to the current organization in 2012.

The FARC primarily used guerrilla warfare, but also waged conventional combat. They kidnapped tourists and authorities, and waged terrorist attacks like exploding car bombs in urban areas. The guerrillas use conventional small arms, mines and some improvised weapons. The main sources of funds comes from charges for releasing hostages, donations from supporters, cattle theft and drug trafficking; the latter considered the most profitable source.

In July 2004, journalist Carlos Villalón detailed how the FARC fosters the cocaine trade in his article “Cocaine Country.”⁵⁶ To begin the scheme, a FARC dealer passes through small towns located in the areas controlled by the FARC. This passage occurs at the end of each week. All activity is processed in an improvised office near the city. It is impossible to determine the exact amount of territory that FARC controls, but some estimates affirm that they have a strong influence over one-fifth of Colombia. This territorial portion covers approximately 145,000 sq. km., controlling about 280,000 people. During production season, a warning is given that a FARC dealer is coming to buy cocaine base. Farmers move to the village in order to sell their product. A large number of them produce an average of one kilo of cocaine base per month. The FARC member pays about \$1,000 per kilogram.

Another way to raise funds is through a 30 percent tax that the FARC collects from farmers every time they sell cocaine base to traffickers. After these costs the farmer may profit about \$325 per month. The cycle continues for most of the year except for the dry season (January and February), when the production of the coca leaf decreases dramatically and the FARC do not pass through as often.

⁵⁶Carlos Villalón, “An Illegal Cash Crop Sustains Local Farmers and a 40-year-old Guerrilla Movement in Southern Colombia,” *National Geographic* (July 2004), <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0407/feature2/> (accessed 10 October 2012).

On 26 March 2001, Colombian authorities announced that about 30 kilograms of uranium were seized in an operation triggered on a side road in southern Bogota.⁵⁷ This event supports the hypothesis that the FARC would be engaged in executing a terrorist project universally identified as a "dirty bomb." Should this hypothesis be confirmed, the Colombian authorities might face a threat unprecedented in more than 40 years of civil war. This might bring tragic consequences, especially for civilians. These consequences could expand throughout the neighboring nations of Colombia including Brazil.

Another recent indication of major importance is the current connection that has been established between FARC and ETA, the Basque Separatist Front, one of the most notorious terrorist organizations in Europe.⁵⁸ In the recent past, connections with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were confirmed, with three members of that terrorist organization having been arrested in Colombian territory while training the FARC rebels in the use of weapons and explosives.⁵⁹ Connections of this nature are eminently dangerous, taking into account the existing bonds held by the FARC abroad, including notorious organized crime organizations from different countries, especially in Bolivia, Brazil, the U.S., Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

Brazilian Connections

In April 2001, the Colombian military seized the largest drug distributor in Brazil. Luis Fernando da Costa, better known as Fernandinho Beira Mar (Freddy Seashore) was responsible

⁵⁷Alvaro de Souza Pinheira, "As FARC Desnudadas," *Eletronic Magazine Defesa@NET* (16 May 2008), <http://moraishvinna.blogspot.com/2008/05/venezuela-pode-sofrer-represalias-se.html> (accessed 20 February 2013).

⁵⁸Defesanet, "Terror – ETA recebeu treinamento das FARC na Venezuela," <http://www.defesanet.com.br/geopolitica/noticia/911/Terror> (accessed 4 November 2012).

⁵⁹James Monaghan, "Colombia Charges Suspected IRA Members for Training FARC Rebels," CNN.com, http://articles.cnn.com/2001-08-21/world/colombia.IRA_1_farc-niall-connelly-ira-members?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 6 November 2012).

for the distribution of approximately 70 percent of the cocaine that entered Brazil. He was captured during Operation Gato Negro (Black Cat), near Barrancominas, a city not far from the border with Brazil. Front 16 of the FARC used this region as a training base for operations, transit territory, and an area for coca cultivation, refining and shipment to Venezuela and Brazil. Military sources have reported that three departments in this region (Vichada, where Beira Mar was arrested, Guainia, and Guavi), are responsible for more than 80 percent of the cocaine controlled by the FARC. Colombian authorities considered Beira Mar to be the largest ally of the FARC in foreign trade, because the rebels received arms from Beira Mar in exchange for a Brazilian-bound shipment of cocaine.⁶⁰ He exchanged \$10 million per month in weapons and ammunition for cocaine. Colombian officials announced the shipment of 10,000 AK-47s sent to the FARC by the Russian mafia in 2000. They also affirmed that Beira Mar had delivered “10,000 arms and 3 million cartridges” to the FARC. A single airdrop in October 1999 was said by U.S. intelligence officials to have delivered \$50 million worth of AK-47s deep inside FARC-held territory.⁶¹

According to the Amazon Military Command, for two months in mid-2004 the FARC planned assaults on Brazilian Army positions along the 1,600-kilometer border between the two countries. The guerrilla group sought to obtain weapons, ammunition, food and medical supplies. The military in Querari, a platoon on the border considered the most tense, was reinforced by 40 men trained in jungle warfare. It was the last potentially aggressive movement of the guerrillas recorded by the Brazilian military intelligence network in the area of Brazil. At that time, satellite photos of the Ministry of Defense showed the marks of a camp through lower woods in an area

⁶⁰LaVerle Berry, “A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded, Terrorist and Extremist Groups,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, May 2002, 63.

⁶¹Eleonora Gosman, “Temen una guerra entre bandas de narcos en Brasil,” *Clarín* (24 April 2001), <http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2001/04/24/i-02401.htm> (accessed 11 January 2013).

customarily used by the guerrillas. Analysts of Amazon Military Command in Manaus believe that the FARC were gathering a column with about 160 men and women in Jurupari.

It is in this context one must analyze the information recorded in the materials published in 2005 in the newspaper *Correio Braziliense*.⁶² With the title “Guerilla Training Landless,” the reports describes training activities on techniques of urban warfare in the region of Pindoty Porá, Department of Canindeyú, Paraguayan territory bordering the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Paraná. This training was held in the months of May, July and August of that year. Colombian instructors of the FARC trained members of the Brazilian MST (Landless Movement) and criminal organizations responsible for the safety of drug distribution points in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. According to published information, the choice of the region Pindoty Porá by the FARC is not random. The site has been used for at least two years as a strategic point for trafficking of cocaine, marijuana, and weapons, thriving with the acceptance of Paraguayan authorities and under the approval of the fragile law of that country.

A confidential report produced by the intelligence of Federal Police dated 28 April 2012 shows that the Colombian guerrillas have systematically violated the Colombia-Brazil border which they has been using for their business, especially drug trafficking. The conclusion is part of the final report of the investigation that led to the arrest of Jose Samuel Sánchez, nickname "Tatareto," appointed by the Federal Police as part of the finances and logistics commission of the 1st Front of the FARC, one of most important detachments of the Colombian guerrillas.⁶³

The group working on the Brazilian base used techniques known by the FARC. The communication system that Tatareto kept on his farm near Manaus was triggered at

⁶²Maria Clara Prates, “Guerrilha treina sem terra,” *Correio Braziliense*, October 30, 2005.

⁶³Notícias Terra, “PF prende no Brasil segundo homem das FARC,” Terra.com, <http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/noticias/0,,OI4420299-EI5030,00-PF+prende+no+Brasil+segundo+homem+das+Farc.html> (accessed 6 November 2012).

predetermined times for contacts with the guerrillas in Colombia.⁶⁴ The two radio communication devices were buried inside a barrel, exactly as the FARC used to hide weapons and drugs in the Colombian jungle. The antenna used, which is not usually discreet, rested carefully camouflaged between the tops of two trees. Tatareto is accused of running a major trafficking route that used the Amazon rivers to reach Manaus, the capital of the state of Amazonas, sending cocaine shipments produced by the FARC in the Colombian jungle. From there, the drug was distributed to both other Brazilian states and Europe.

Brazilian Federal Police officials say the guerrillas in Colombia came to establish bases in the Brazilian Amazon once they were cornered by military operations of the Alvaro Uribe's government. Tatareto, who was in charge of fundraising for the FARC, moved his operational base to Brazil where he could coordinate activities with tranquility, without the danger of frequent armed confrontation with the official forces of Colombia.⁶⁵

Researchers mapped the two-way scheme: the FARC send cocaine from Colombia to Brazil and in reverse, the proceeds from the drugs trade are sent to guerrillas camps in Colombia, either in cash or in the form of groceries and supplies purchased in Brazil for refining the coca.⁶⁶ Tatareto provided part of the funds for the purchase of groceries and general logistics (fuel, chemicals, etc.) which were purchased in Leticia, Colombia, on the border with Tabatinga, Brazil, and sent to their staff in the jungle. Loads were carried by Colombian ferries that made the regular trip between the Colombian cities of Leticia and La Pedrera through Brazilian territory.

⁶⁴Rodrigo Rangel, "Captura de guerrilheiro pela PF em Manaus revela base das FARC no Brasil," *Estadao.com*, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,captura-de-guerrilheiro-pela-pf-em-manaus-revela-base-das-farc-no-brasil,552330,0.htm> (accessed 6 November 2012).

⁶⁵Rodrigo Rangel, "Serviço antiterror mapeou Rota Solimoes," *Estadao.com*, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,servico-antiterror-mapeou-rota-solimoes,552334,0.htm> (accessed November 6, 2012).

⁶⁶Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, "O Narcoterrorismo na América Latina," UNODOC, <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/brazil/narcotraf.pdf> (accessed 6 November 2012), 24.

Terrorist Threat

The FARC's focus does not extend outside of Colombian territory, even though their activities may be perceived as threatening to Brazil's national interest. FARC's actions within Colombian territory and their links with networks of organized crime and arms and drugs trafficking provide them with the ability to radiate terror. This inspires and guides criminal organizations which operate in Brazil, which in turn can lead to acts of indiscriminate violence, bringing a new and even more serious level to its confrontation with police forces. In this way, the escalation of violence and widespread visibility achieved through attacks by terrorist groups such as FARC fully disclosed by the media can lead to the emergence of terrorist acts committed by criminal organizations, even without direct operational links with international terror networks.

Despite not being related to aspects that characterize the contemporary phenomenon of terrorism, it is appropriate to mention there are connections between criminal organizations in Brazilian territory and similar organizations, guerrilla movements, and terrorist groups in neighboring countries who have relationships with the FARC. These connections may create the possibility that the Brazilian groups may incorporate terrorism into their domestical operations, whether by agreement or by mimicry. The existence of powerful drug trafficking leaders with tremendous internal power, influence, and strong connections abroad with the FARC, i.e. Beira Mar, leads one to believe in these relationships. For example, one can cite the acts perpetrated by the criminal organization First Command of the Capital (PCC) in Sao Paulo between 12 and 17 May 2006. There were about 300 attacks in just over five days.⁶⁷ They were distributed among a

⁶⁷Barbara Souza, "Dos 564 mortos durante os ataques do PCC, 505 eram civis," *Estadao.com.br*, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,dos-564-mortos-durante-os-ataques-do-pcc-em-maio-de-2006-505-eram-civis,393894,0.htm> (accessed 11 January 2013).

wide geographical area, the state of São Paulo, and focused one at a time on specific targets, generating panic throughout the populace.

Several of the fronts in the border region had acted in the middle of the country, but then moved to the border areas because of the severity of the Colombian government's actions. When operations intensify, the FARC guerrillas can easily pass across the borders. Among the goals abroad of the International Front of the FARC are: promoting events with the participation of NGOs, leftist movements and sympathizers; disseminating guerrilla claims; maintaining exchanges with international terrorist groups and contact with arms dealers; negotiating extortions and kidnappings carried out against multinational and foreign companies; and investing and laundering money made from kidnapping, extortion and drug sales.⁶⁸

With this in mind, the FARC conducted training in terrorist tactics and techniques in urban and rural areas with members of the IRA, Hezbollah, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).⁶⁹ They also have contacts with radical groups in Asia, but there is no confirmation of any Arab or Muslim ideological Islamic fundamentalism.⁷⁰

This threat gains strength with increasingly alarming evidence of connections between the FARC and the Iranian-backed terrorist group Hezbollah. In this regard, the presence of Hezbollah in the region known as TBA (Tri-Border Area) is notorious.⁷¹ The drug industry has

⁶⁸Cambio, "La 'diplomacia' de FARC," http://www.cambio.com.co/portadacambio/831/5346592-pag-3_3.html (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁶⁹Steven Morris, "IRA's Links with FARC and ETA Revealed," *Guardian* (25 August 2001), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2001/aug/25/spain.northernireland> (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁷⁰Berry.

⁷¹U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America," USACAC.army.mil, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-15/ch_11.asp (accessed 6 January 2013).

fostered an alliance between Hezbollah and the FARC.⁷² To capitalize on the drug trade and irritate Western security forces, Hezbollah has found a common cause with this communist, narco-political organization. Official intelligence sources say the FARC was in talks with Hezbollah.⁷³ Marxist influence unites the two groups, which now work on more pragmatic goals. During the Cold War, the Soviets flooded the Arab world as well as South America with Marxist propaganda. The effects continue today, and Hezbollah is able to connect ideologically on some levels with the popular Leftist movements in South America. Hezbollah divides the world into the "oppressors" and the "oppressed," and the FARC is a popular Marxist movement, which divides the world into the oppressed and oppressors through the guise of class warfare. Hezbollah's lexicon is "borrowed from Marxism and the Qur'an . . . infused with a sense of moral dualism and millennialism in its division of mankind into good and evil forces."⁷⁴ The U.S. is viewed as the oppressor by both the FARC and Hezbollah, as they work together exchanging guns and drugs. The logical connection between the FARC and Hezbollah would be the latter sending drugs north to the former in exchange for arms. In 2008, Colombian authorities announced that they had arrested suspected Hezbollah members in Colombia.⁷⁵ The capture of the three potential terrorists was part of Operation Titan, an international operation against drug and money laundering which

⁷²Douglas Farah, "The International Exploitation of Drug Wars and What We Can Do About It," Strategy Center, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.260/pub_detail.asp (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁷³Caracas Gringo, "FARC-Hezbollah and Hugo Chavez," <http://caracasgringo.wordpress.com/2009/09/23/farc-hezbollah-and-hugo-chavez/> (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁷⁴Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hezbollah: Politics and Religion* (Sterling, VA: Library of Congress, 2002), 69.

⁷⁵Geofre Legrand, "Bienvenido Senor Ahmadinejad: Tehran's Expanding Latin American Grid," Council on Hemispheric Affairs, <http://www.coha.org/bienvenido-senor-ahmadinejad-tehran-s-expanding-latin-american-grid/> (accessed October 1, 2012).

had been ongoing for about two years.⁷⁶ According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) the suspects were linked with Hezbollah.⁷⁷

Although its main source of funding and support is the terrorist state of Iran, Hezbollah has gotten more involved in arms trafficking, money laundering and drug trafficking to finance and support their network of terror. It receives millions of dollars from Iran each year. It also has extensive financial and political connections in the TBA.⁷⁸ According to Colombian authorities, the alleged members of Hezbollah were using the profits from the sale of illegal drugs purchased from the FARC to finance Hezbollah.⁷⁹

The FARC's International Front operates by integrating subversive groups in Latin America and works to change the diplomatic, consular and trade with neighboring Colombia, and intensifying international activities against the U.S. support to Colombia through Plan Colombia.⁸⁰ According to the Colombian government, since the end of 2006, the FARC has been working to consolidate relations with other clandestine subversive and terrorist groups, and optimize and secure the networks and traffic routes of arms and drugs.⁸¹

⁷⁶Chris Kraul, "Drug Probe Finds Hezbollah Link," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 October 2008, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/22/world/fg-cocainering22> (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁷⁷Anti-Defamation League, "Hezbollah Around the World," http://www.adl.org/main_terrorism/hezbollah_overview.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_5 (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁷⁸Jason Poblete, "Suspected Hezbollah Operatives Nabbed in South America, Congress Should Approve Colombia FTA," <http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/10/26/colombians-help-nab-alleged-hezbollah-operatives-congress-should-approve-fta/> (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁷⁹U.S. Government Printing Office, "Hezbollah in Latin America – Implications for US Homeland Security," FDsys: GPO's Federal Digital System, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72255/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72255.pdf> (accessed 1 October 2012), 7..

⁸⁰U.S. State Department, "United States Support for Colombia," http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html (accessed 6 January 2013).

⁸¹Marcelo Rech, "Hezbollah: Aliados das FARC," *Jornal Defesa*, <http://database.jornaldefesa.pt/ameacas/terrorismo/Hezbollah%20aliados%20das%20FARC.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2012).

São Paulo Forum

The São Paulo Forum was established in July 1990 when the Brazilian Workers Party, led by former Brazilian president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, invited former the president of Cuba, Fidel Castro, and other parties, social and revolutionary movements in Latin America and the Caribbean to the formation of the forum.⁸² It was formalized with a gathering in the city of São Paulo and the participation of 48 organizations, parties and leftist fronts from Latin America and the Caribbean. The goals were to discuss the new international aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989); join the forces of the Latin American leftists in the debate on the alternatives to dominant neoliberal policies in Latin America in the 1990s; and to promote economic, political and cultural integration in the region.

According to the forum directors, more than 100 political parties and organizations currently participate in the meetings. The political positions vary within a broad spectrum, including social democratic parties, communitarian and social organizations inspired by the Catholic Church, trade unions, environmentalist and ethnic groups, nationalist organizations, communist parties, and guerrilla groups.⁸³ These last groups, specifically the FARC, have not been formally banned from the Forum, but have had their access restricted. Nevertheless, this restriction has not prevailed. This was confirmed during the last summit of the Forum in Caracas on 7 March 2012 with the participation of a former Colombian Senator, Piedad Cordoba, whose name has been linked to Raul Reyes' computer, along with other representatives of the guerrilla group.⁸⁴

⁸²Jorge R. Pereira, "Brasil rumo ao Socialismo," Farol da democracia representativa, http://www.faroldademocracia.org/imprimir_editorial.asp?id_editorial=39 (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁸³Carlos Fonseca Teran, "La izquierda latino-americana ante sus nuevos desafios," <http://forodesaopaulo.org/?p=1853> (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁸⁴Duda Teixeira, "Membros do partido de Chavez distribuem folhetos das FARC," Veja

THE AMAZON REGION

The geopolitical position of the Amazon in the heart of South America gives it strategic importance, but also results in it sharing the problems of countries that border Brazil (French Guiana, Suriname, Guiana, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia). Accordingly, it is influenced by the social and political context of these countries which includes narcoguerrilla activities, neo-populism, the increase of military power, and independence movements.⁸⁵

According to the Brazilian Army's constitutional mission, concerns in the Amazon can be translated into four main issues: ensuring the sovereignty of the land borders, deterring and combating illegal activities, protecting the subsoil, and giving credibility to the actions of area defense.⁸⁶ For the purpose of this work, the focus will be on the two first issues presented. Also, it should be noted that nothing is done isolatedly in the Amazon. The joint action and perfect understanding of the need of integration with the other branches (Navy and Air Force), with the institutions and organizations of the government, especially the Federal Police and the population in the area, is what will allow these actions to be highly successful.

Stretching the focus to the region between Brazil and Colombia, one observes that the great length of the border between the two countries combined with a small amount of state presence allows the entry of Colombians who are fleeing armed conflict. When being pushed by armed groups, people move toward the border with Brazil. Leticia has been converted into a

Abril, <http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/internacional/membros-do-partido-de-chavez-distribuem-folhetos-das-farc> (accessed 1 October 2012).

⁸⁵Maria Regina Soares Lima, *Agenda Sul-Americana: mudanças e desafios no início do século* (Brasília, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2007), 15.

⁸⁶Brazilian Ministry of Defense, "O Exército Brasileiro na Defesa da Soberania da Amazônia," <http://www.sae.gov.br/seminarioamazonia/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Artigo-Gen-Ex-Mattos-Cmt-CMA.pdf> (accessed 26 September 2012).

receiving city and is growing tremendously with displaced people who are called "desplazados" who come through the Caqueta and Putumayo Rivers.⁸⁷ In addition to this, the increased risk of "desplazados" on the border with Brazil is enhanced due to the systematic closure of the borders of Colombia with Ecuador and Venezuela.⁸⁸ With the pressure exerted by the Colombian state, the FARC seek new areas to plant coca and install new laboratories. Despite being an area with the peculiar difficulties of a jungle region, the intentions of the narcoguerrillas have been proven by several incidents on the border between Brazil and Colombia. The presence of the FARC at the border weighs negatively on the social peace and causes distorted economic development in the region. The drug trafficker's network does not recognize borders and eventually attracts ordinary people and even authorities to these highly profitable activities, namely drug trafficking and related crimes.

There is no doubt that the FARC takes action on the Brazilian side of the border. Around São Gabriel da Cachoeira, in the state of Amazonas, two guerrilla fronts have been acting: Front 1 and Front 16.⁸⁹ Those fronts belong to the Oriental Block, with 447 guerrillas in Front 1 and 2,853 guerrillas in Front 16.⁹⁰ Front 1 is the closest to Querari and is comprised of 300 guerrillas. Its first camps are less than 30 km. from the Brazilian platoon in Querari. Mitú, which is only 50 km. from the Brazilian detachment, has been completely dominated by the guerrillas. Across the

⁸⁷Maire-Helene Verney, "Indígenas colombianos huyen a un pueblo del Amazonas buscando seguridad," Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, ACNUR.org, http://www.acnur.org/index.php?id_pag=8022 (accessed 25 September 2012).

⁸⁸Maria Camila Lopez Rojas, "Efectos De La Regionalización De La Política De Seguridad Democrática," Scielo.unal.edu, http://www.scielo.unal.edu.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0121-56122007000100007&lng=es&nrm= (accessed 25 September 2012).

⁸⁹A front consists of a group between 50 to 500 men who control and attack certain areas of Colombia.

⁹⁰Colombian Armed Forces, "Informacion sobre el enemigo, Apreciacion de Inteligencia," Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, Anexo Inteligencia, Bogota, Colombia, 2010.

Head of the Dog, closer to the platoon of Cucuí, the area belongs to Front 16, one of the strongest Fronts of the entire FARC structure. It is responsible for the guerrilla business and financial system.⁹¹ This includes several activities like the management of coca paste produced in its "territory," the use of the money earned from the drug trade and acquisition of weapons.⁹²

On the Brazilian side, somewhat distant from the boundary line, São Gabriel is a kind of warehouse for that market. Grocery stores that sell wholesale are responsible for supplying the FARC camps on the Colombian side of the border. The transit of vessels, small aircraft and natives from one side to the other is intense. It is this activity which provides the illegal trade between Brazil and the guerrillas. This movement leaves the authorities powerless because the Colombians go to the Brazilian side anonymously. They are not identified as belonging to the FARC. Of higher concern is the money exchanged for food sent to the guerrillas. The payment is often made in the form of drugs. This is a sign that there may be laboratories within the Brazilian territory which turn coca paste into cocaine. If soldiers are meticulous when inspecting a boat, and discover and seize kilos of cocaine paste belonging to the FARC, the guerrillas will certainly assault the platoon to recover what was taken. There are doubts about whether or not the platoons are ready for this type of confrontation. The FARC's firepower is alarming. The guerrillas possess powerful weapons like the latest in Russian rifles. The Brazilian troops only have Parafal fusils, which have been around for 43 years.⁹³

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Crisis Group International, "Ponder fin al conflicto con las FARC en Colombia: jugar la carta correcta," http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/latin-america/colombia/nding_colombias_farc_conflict___dealing_the_right_card_spanish_web, (accessed 6 January 2013), 14-15.

⁹³Revista Época, "Na fronteira com as FARC," [RevistaEpoca.Globo.com](http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/Epoca/0,,ERT11994-15223-11994-3934,00.html), <http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/Epoca/0,,ERT11994-15223-11994-3934,00.html> (accessed 25 September 2012).

Brazilian National Policy

Brazilian government has been adopting various measures to tackle the problem of guerrilla warfare. Such measures have a preventive and defensive character and do not include offensive actions like those implemented in Colombia. In this context, in 1985, President José Sarney created the Projeto Calha Norte (Northern Path Project), with the purpose of strengthening the national presence to face several threats along the Amazon border, among them drug trafficking.⁹⁴

In this regard, within the guidelines of the Northern Path Project and addressing the threats that were primarily put together based on the performance of the FARC during the 1980s, the Brazilian Army began to implement changes in its organization in order to strengthen its presence in the Amazon region. In 1988 the Brazilian Army installed the Special Border Platoons of Iauretê, Querari, and São Joaquim at the front facing Colombia.⁹⁵ In 2003 another platoon, Tunuí-Cachoeira, was created and the following year, Pari-Cachoeira. In 2004 the Brazilian Army installed another jungle brigade, the 2nd Jungle Infantry Brigade, in São Gabriel da Cachoeira. The municipality of São Gabriel da Cachoeira is currently the headquarters of the 2nd Jungle Infantry Brigade, the 5th Jungle Infantry Battalion, the 21st Engineer Company Construction and the Posting of Airspace Control of São Gabriel da Cachoeira. The 2nd Brigade Task Force is composed of the 5th Battalion, 3rd Jungle Infantry Battalion in the city of Barcelos, and the 56th Jungle Infantry Battalion under activation process in the city of Santa Isabel do Rio Negro. The 5th Battalion assembled seven Special Border Platoons as a surveillance force. Of

⁹⁴Ministério da Defesa “Programa Calha Norte,” <https://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/programas-e-projetos/programa-calha-norte.html> (accessed 6 November 2012). Calha Norte Project updated in January 2011.

⁹⁵Paulo Kuhlmann, “Mudança de Estrutura de Defesa do Exército Brasileiro (1985-2007),” http://www.brasa.org/_sitemason/files/e91TVK/Kuhlmann%20Paulo.pdf (accessed 6 November 2012).

these, the five platoons mentioned above are located on the border with Colombia (Iauaretê, Querari, São Joaquim, Pari-Cachoeira, Tunuí-Cachoeira) to oversee a front of 1,644 km.. This means that each platoon is responsible for approximately 240 km. of the border, an area too extensive for effective oversight. There are also two other platoons which are on the border with Venezuela (Cucuí and Maturacá). The distance between each platoon and the 5th Battalion varies from 200 to 500 km. São Gabriel da Cachoeira is 846 km. away from Manaus. Since there is no road, the transportation is by river or air. By boat, the distance is 1,102 km. There are no roads connecting the city to other towns. These conditions make any support and effective presence much more difficult than in any other region of the country.




Figure 3. Current Locations of Brazilian Platoons on Borderline and FARC's Presence

Source: "Na Fronteira com as FARC," *Epoca Magazine*, edition 502 (28 December 2007)
<http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/Epoca/0..EDG90888-6009.00-NA+FRONTIERA+COM+AS+FARC.html> (accessed 12 November 2012).

Brazil is seeking to partner with Colombia in order to combat drug trafficking more effectively. In July 2003 Brazil established a Working Group for the Prevention of Crime and Terrorism with Colombia aimed at discussing the agility of intelligence sharing and cooperation in judicial and criminal investigation.⁹⁶ Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding concerning military cooperation was signed with Colombia in June 2003 between the Ministries of Defense which led to the Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation in Defense Matters which was signed in July 2008.⁹⁷ In addition to this, a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Combating Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms and Ammunition was signed by the two countries. On the same day, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru signed an agreement of cooperation concerning border matters, which includes patrolling the rivers, joint military actions, and exchange of intelligence information to combat drug trafficking, smuggling and other illicit activities.⁹⁸

Military Command of Amazon (CMA in Portuguese) has between 23,000 and 25,000 men, including members of the Jungle Infantry units. The surveillance of the region also involves advanced resources of the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) which includes the electronic aircraft R-99A, used for advanced warning; and the R99B used for remote sensing. Both of these aircraft are

⁹⁶UOL Noticias, “Brasil e Colombia assinam acordo contra as drogas e o terrorismo,” [noticias.uol.com.br, http://noticias.uol.com.br/inter/reuters/2003/06/20/ult27u36407.jhtm](http://noticias.uol.com.br/inter/reuters/2003/06/20/ult27u36407.jhtm) (accessed 6 January 2013).

⁹⁷Brazilian Congress, “CCJ aprova acordo de cooperação militar entre Brasil e Colombia,” [câmara.leg.br, http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/RELACOES-EXTERIORES/135990-CCJ-APROVA-ACORDO-DE-COOPERACAO-MILITAR-ENTRE-BRASIL-E-COLOMBIA.html](http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/RELACOES-EXTERIORES/135990-CCJ-APROVA-ACORDO-DE-COOPERACAO-MILITAR-ENTRE-BRASIL-E-COLOMBIA.html) (accessed 6 January 2013).

⁹⁸Brazilian Government, “Brasil, Colombia e Peru vão ampliar cooperação militar para segurança da tríplice fronteira,” [brasil.gov.br, http://www.brasil.gov.br/noticias/arquivos/2012/05/30/brasil-colombia-e-peru-va-ampliar-cooperacao-militar-para-seguranca-da-triplice-fronteira](http://www.brasil.gov.br/noticias/arquivos/2012/05/30/brasil-colombia-e-peru-va-ampliar-cooperacao-militar-para-seguranca-da-triplice-fronteira) (accessed 6 January 2013).

mounted on platforms of civil jets, the ERJ-145 which is made by Embraer.⁹⁹ These aircraft operate with the radars of the Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM) and can coordinate fighters or turboprop of light attack for executing missions of clandestine aircraft interception or bombing missions.

CMA will install three new bases in Acre distributed among the Districts of Foz do Breu, Pé da Serra, and Foz do Moa, all in Marechal Taumaturgo. The package also includes the creation of five other units in Amazonas and Amapá. In 2009, the Army completed the transfer of 4,000 troops of the 2nd Jungle Infantry Brigade which were then installed in Niterói in the state of Rio de Janeiro, for the upper Negro River.¹⁰⁰

The Air Force Command set up two advanced centers of air operations in Vilhena in the state of Rondonia, and Eirunepé in the state of Amazonas. Currently, military aviation has bases in Manaus, Porto Velho, Boa Vista, and with certain limitations in Rio Branco, all capitals of the states in the Amazon region. In Serra do Cachimbo, the Brazilian Air Force maintains a testing center and has also installed facilities equipped for combat actions.

The Ministry of Defense has been undertaking several joint operations aimed at integrating the efforts of the three branches. The military operations that followed and their objectives are as follows:

1. Operation Tapuru, 2002: to ensure the integrity of the border area in the region of "Head of the Dog."
2. Operation Timbo I, 2003: to prevent entry into the Brazilian national territory by people from bordering countries which are involved in internal conflict.

⁹⁹Defesabr.com, "Força Aérea Brasileira – FAB, Meios Disponíveis," http://www.defesabr.com/Fab/fab_r99.htm (accessed 6 January 2013).

¹⁰⁰Brazilian Army, Military Command of Amazon, "O Exército Brasileiro na Defesa da Amazônia," SAE.gov.br, <http://www.sae.gov.br/seminarioamazonia/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Artigo-Gen-Ex-Mattos-Cmt-CMA.pdf> (accessed 12 September 2012).

3. Operation Timbo II, 2004: to ensure the defense of sovereignty with the preservation of territorial integrity, heritage and national interests in the Amazon.
4. Operation Timbo III, 2005: to conduct a joint training of defense of sovereignty by focusing on the preservation of territorial integrity, heritage, and national interests in the Amazon as well as to intensify the presence of the State.
5. Operation Timbo IV, 2006: same goal Operation Timbo 2005.
6. Operation Tucunaré, 2006: to ensure the defense of sovereignty with the preservation of territorial integrity, heritage and national interests on the Amazon.
7. Operation Solimoes, 2007: to ensure the defense of sovereignty with the preservation of territorial integrity, heritage and national interests in the Amazon against opponents of inferior military power.
8. Operation Poraquê, 2008: to train the commands and staffs in planning, command, control and execution of joint operations in scenarios of conventional armed conflict in the Amazonian environment.
9. Operation Agata, 2012: to restrain illegal activities like drug trafficking, environmental crimes, illegal mining, and smuggling in the border region.¹⁰¹

Most of these operations have been involving the Army, Navy, Air Force, and institutions such as the Federal Police, IRS, and IBAMA.¹⁰²

In addition to this unilateral effort, the Brazilian government has been seeking cooperation with other countries in the Amazon region. On 29 March 2012, Brazil, Colombia,

¹⁰¹Dr. Nelson Jobim, Ministério de Estado da Defesa, “Comissão de Relações Exteriores e de Defesa Nacional, Subcomissão Permanente da Amazonia,” (lecture, Brazilian Staff College, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 2012).

¹⁰²Brazilian Ministry of Defense, “Operações em Andamento,” Defesa.gov.br, <https://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/operacoes-em-andamento> (accessed 6 January 2013).

and Peru strengthened commitment in the military realm to protect the border against transnational crimes. In the tripartite meeting of the chiefs of the General Staffs of the Armed Forces held in Manaus, representatives of the three countries agreed to strengthen multilateral cooperation policies to combat crimes such as drug trafficking, illegal mining and smuggling.¹⁰³ The meeting represents an awareness by the authorities regarding this common problem. All of these efforts related to international cooperation and internal training must be in accordance with Brazilian law.

Technologies at Disposal

In 1990, the government created the Amazon Protection System (SIPAM) to control all activities in the Amazon region.¹⁰⁴ Later in 2002, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso created the SIVAM, linked to SIPAM.¹⁰⁵ A common goal of SIVAM and SIPAM is to minimize threats from drug trafficking. SIVAM is the technical infrastructure of SIPAM and is considered to be the main instrument for the protection of the Amazon and defense of national sovereignty. The technical apparatus of SIVAM consists of six satellites, 18 aircraft, 25 radars, various fixed and mobile weather stations, and over 200 platforms for data collection in rivers. The project enables the surveillance of 5.2 million sq. km. and aims to ensure the protection of the Amazon. It provides data about the ground, vegetation, and enables detection of aircraft flying over the region. According to the official discourse of the Brazilian government, the data collected will

¹⁰³Ministério da Defesa, “Brasil, Colômbia e Peru vão ampliar cooperação militar para segurança da triplice fronteira,” <https://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/noticias-do-md/2455121-30052012-defesa-brasil-colombia-e-peru-va-ampliar-cooperacao-militar-para-seguranca-da-triplice-fronteira.html> (accessed 26 September 2012).

¹⁰⁴Ministério da Defesa, “Sistema de Proteção da Amazonia,” [Sipam.gov.br](http://www.sipam.gov.br/content/view/3226/), <http://www.sipam.gov.br/content/view/3226/> (accessed 26 September 2012).

¹⁰⁵Carlos Vuyk de Aquino, “SIVAM, Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia,” <http://www2.fiesp.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/sivam.pdf> (accessed 26 September 2012).

also serve in assisting to combat deforestation and drug trafficking, and allows better scientific knowledge of the Brazilian Amazon.¹⁰⁶

Both systems are designed to protect the entire area of the Amazon and seek to promote sustainable development for the region and its inhabitants.¹⁰⁷ As a member of SIPAM, SIVAM comprises an infrastructure of monitoring and analysis which collects, processes, produces, integrates, evaluates, and disseminates data and information of interest to other members of SIPAM organizations. This condition enables the development of knowledge that supports global and coordinated actions of government agencies that operate in the Amazon - Indian National Foundation, Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), the Federal Police, Armed Forces, and others. In turn, the SIPAM was conceived as a multidisciplinary coordination involving many public and private institutions in order to better use the resources of the infrastructure of SIVAM. The Brazilian Army is listed as one of those which may benefit from the SIVAM.

Regarding the system itself, the SIPAM consists of three subsystems. The first one is the Data Acquisition Subsystem which consists of a network of sensors including satellite remote sensing and data collection equipment for meteorological, hydrological and environmental purposes. The second subsystem is the Data Processing and Visualization subsystem which consists of technical experts, relational databases and geographic information, and artificial intelligence software. This subsystem will allow the analysis of thousands of pieces of information while generating products which will provide the exploration of scenarios, along with

¹⁰⁶Ambiente Brasil, “Projeto SIVAM: Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia,” Ambientebrasil.com.br, http://ambientes.ambientebrasil.com.br/florestal/programas_e_projetos/projeto_sivam_-_sistema_de_vigilancia_da_amazonia.html (accessed 6 January 2013).

¹⁰⁷Humberto Jose Lourencao, “A Defesa Nacional da Amazônia: o Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (SIVAM)” (Master’s thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, Brazil, 2003), 38.

other data and image processing equipment. Finally, the Telecommunications Subsystem consists of a physical telecommunications network composed of fiber optics and exclusive channels of satellite communication using public, private, and its own resources to maintain the system's integration and reliability.¹⁰⁸

In addition to SIPAM/SIVAM, the government and the military are working to gradually implement the Border Monitoring System, SISFRON (Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de Fronteiras).¹⁰⁹ It is a system of Command and Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4IVR) that aims to provide the ground forces a means to an effective presence on the Brazilian border areas.¹¹⁰

The SISFRON aims to increase the capacity of the Brazilian Army and effectively monitor the state of the near 16,000 km. of land border. The system should provide the military means to detect, identify, locate, accompany, analyze, stock, and report the occurrence of events of interest to defense and other government agencies linked to public safety.¹¹¹

The project may involve real (R) \$12 billion in investments (U.S. \$6 billion) and will be exclusively under Brazilian Army application and control.¹¹² The expected implementation period is 10 years. Of the total, R\$5.930 billion (U.S. \$2.8 billion) will be allocated for technological infrastructure, about R\$ 3 billion (U.S. \$1.5 billion) for civil works infrastructure, and R\$ 3

¹⁰⁸Lourencao, 65.

¹⁰⁹Tahiane Stochero, "Em transformação, Exército planeja estar totalmente equipado em 10 anos," *Globo.com*, <http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/em-transformacao-exercito-planeja-estar-totalmente-equipado-em-10-anos.html> (accessed 26 September 2012).

¹¹⁰Defesanet, "A Quadratura do Circulo," *Defesanet.com.br*, <http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/7600/SISFRON----A-Quadratura-do-Circulo> (accessed 6 January 2013).

¹¹¹Alexandre Galante, "Estratégia, Tecnologia Militar e Segurança," *Isto e Dinheiro*. *Forte.jor.br*, <http://www.forte.jor.br/2012/01/13/defesa-bilionaria/> (accessed 6 January 2013).

¹¹²*Ibid.*

billion (U.S. \$1.5 billion) for infrastructure to support operational performance. Its area of operation is in Dourados, a city in a border strip in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, where the 4th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade is headquartered. This acquisition process will unfold in the fiscal year 2012 and if necessary, will be supplemented in 2013. In 2013, technical experimentation of the installed system is scheduled for possible adjustments in order to provide conditions to begin the deployment in areas of the Amazon Military Command and South Military Command, in 2014 and 2015 respectively.¹¹³

One of the highest priorities of SISFRON is to improve monitoring of the Amazon. In this regard, there are plans for employing the national radars SABER M60 and SABER M200.¹¹⁴ The Brazilian Army has commissioned an initial series of eight SABER M60 radars. More units will be required for use in conjunction with portable guided missiles and 35mm and 40mm cannons. Besides usage more visible during the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, the Army intends to use the SABER M60 radar in the SISFRON Program for the protection and surveillance of borders, especially in the Amazon.¹¹⁵ The SABER M60 is able to track up to 40 targets simultaneously, up to 60 km. away and 5,000 meters of altitude. In conjunction with other assets, the result will be better images captured from satellites, implementation of a network of sensors, surveillance radars and optical viewfinders with state of the art technology. This will

¹¹³Brazilian Army, "SISFRON pode envolver R\$12 bi," CCOMGEX.eb.mil.br, http://www.ccomgex.eb.mil.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=88:sisfron-pode-envolver-r-12-bi&catid=82&Itemid=714 (accessed 6 January 2013).

¹¹⁴Miguel Machado, "Os programas de modernizacao do Exercito Brasileiro," Operacional.pt, <http://www.operacional.pt/os-programas-de-modernizacao-do-exercito-brasileiro/> (accessed 2 October 2012).

¹¹⁵Brazil will be headquarters of 2014 Soccer World Cup. This event will have 12 cities throughout the country as headquarters of different phases of the competition. In 2016, the city of Rio de Janeiro will be the headquarters of Olympic Games.

allow better monitoring of the borders and the ability to wage more repressive actions in partnership with other agencies such as the Federal Police.

Another matter that has caught the attention of the Brazilian Army regarding improvements in surveillance in the Amazon region is related to the employment of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). To execute this project, Flight Technologies Company was selected for developing its technology.¹¹⁶ The company will be responsible for military training on the operation of the VT-15 system, as the UAV was named. The vehicle can fly up to 10 hours, with a range of up to 120 km. Considering the “amazonic” distances, this range is not the best, but it is a starting point. The development of the UAV has recently gained the attention of the press in Brazil. The expectation is that the Brazilian Army may use the device to control the borders of the country in combating drug trafficking. Another use of the vehicle may be the supervision of slums and closed points of Brazilian forests.¹¹⁷ The expectation is that by the end of 2012 these devices will begin operating in the country. In 2006, a cheaper version of the aircraft manufactured in Brazil was used by the Brazilian Navy in Haiti.¹¹⁸ Much has already been mentioned regarding the relationship between the Brazilian Army and the Federal Police.

The Brazilian Army and the Federal Police

The Brazilian Federal Government instituted the Integrated Plan to Combat Crack and Other Drugs aiming to unify and optimize efforts in combatting drugs. The Armed Forces were

¹¹⁶O Vale, “Empresa de S. Jose vai atuar no Vant,” *Ovale.com.br*, <http://www.ovale.com.br/regi-o/empresa-de-s-jose-vai-atuar-no-vant-1.130796> (accessed 2 October 2012).

¹¹⁷Another good use of UAV during the coming sporting events in Brazil, mainly in Rio de Janeiro.

¹¹⁸Marcelo Miranda Breker, “Avião não-tripulado poderá fiscalizar favelas brasileiras,” *Terra.com*, <http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/noticias/0,,OI5200892-EI306,00-Aviao+nao+tripulado+podera+fiscalizar+favelas+brasileiras.html> (accessed 12 October 2012).

giving the responsibility of supporting the creation of the Integrated Center for Combating Organized Crime (CICON), emphasizing drug trafficking, in conjunction with the Operations and Management Center of the Amazon Protection System (CENSIPAM).¹¹⁹

In fact, the Armed Forces have a large contingent of men in the border region. The Army has the largest number of men, over 30,000. Combined with the presence of military organizations at strategic points on the border with neighboring countries, the capillarity of the Army in the border region has the potential to provide the mobility necessary to assist the Federal Police operations to combat drug trafficking. It is worth noting that the Special Border Platoons located in the Amazon region have already had an operational role by providing logistical support to the Federal Police and inspecting vessels. Therefore, they exert police power on the borderline and assume important role in the Army's actions to combat drug trafficking.

Research conducted by the Union Court of Auditors with delegates assigned to the border offices produced important information.¹²⁰ Of those who responded, 72.3 percent said that the Armed Forces do not act in collaboration with the Federal Police in the border region, especially in helping to combat drug trafficking. The remaining respondents, 27.7 percent, reported that the action is effective in logistical support (56.5 percent), overt surveillance of the border (26 percent), and the approach of vehicles and people entering the country by land (34.7 percent).¹²¹ This research also identified that the integration of Military Commands of the Army, Navy and

¹¹⁹Brazilian Presidency of Republic, "Decreto N 7.179 de 20 de Maio de 2010," http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Decreto/D7179.htm, (accessed 11 October 2012), Article 5, Paragraph 2.

¹²⁰Brazilian Audit Office, "Política Nacional sobre Drogas," TCU.gov.br, http://portal2.tcu.gov.br/portal/page/portal/TCU/comunidades/programas_governo/areas_atuacao_seguranca_publica/Relatório_pol%C3%ADtica_nacional_sobre_drogas.pdf Section 3.5 , 34 (accessed 11 October 2012).

¹²¹Brazilian Audit Office, Section 4.1, 34.

Air Force with the Federal Police is nonexistent, "poor" or "very poor" at 48.6 percent, 71.2 percent, and 80.6 percent, respectively.¹²²

One factor that influenced the result obtained in the research can be attributed to the response time from Military Commands in the decision making process, which does not align with the required process for operations triggered by the Federal Police. Since this is a hierarchical institution, there is a limitation on the autonomy of military commanders of units in the border region to conduct actions in fulfillment of its subsidiary mission to combat drug trafficking along with the Federal Police. Another reason is the troops do not receive specialized training in exercising police power in order to support the Federal Police in actions to combat drug trafficking.

Finally, Military Commands have limited resources to accomplish this subsidiary mission given the low availability of fuel, non-lethal weapons, vehicles, ships and aircraft to carry out actions to combat drug trafficking. Regarding the Army Command, factors like lack of campaign material such as tents and awnings, and individual equipment such as backpacks, canteens, holsters and charger ports, besides food to serve the platoons in operation, have a considerable influence in the operational reach of those units.¹²³

Creation of the CICON with the participation of the Armed Forces is not yet in effect.¹²⁴ In this regard, it is worth noting the priority of employment of intelligence activity to increase vigilance against the action of transnational organized crime involving drugs, weapons and

¹²²Ibid., Section 4.1, 35.

¹²³Rodrigo Rangel, "Na fronteira com as FARC," <http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/Epoca/0,,EDG80777-6009,00-NA+FRONTEIRA+COM+AS+FARC.html> (accessed 6 January 2013).

¹²⁴Radar Oficial, "Ata N 5/2012 – Plenário," [Radaroficial.com.br](http://www.radaroficial.com.br), <http://www.radaroficial.com.br/d/202602> Section 9.2 (accessed 11 October 2012).

terrorism possess three issues directly linked to the FARC. In this matter, the CENSIPAM has a strategic role because it is responsible for coordinating and articulating SIPAM.¹²⁵ Its role is to provide the physical and technological infrastructure for means of communication (voice and data access) in more remote locations in the Amazon by integrating the bases and remote sites. Moreover, the CENSIPAM should provide the expertise of staff to assist the Federal Police in processing and analysis of images.¹²⁶

In this context and in partnership with participating agencies, CICON's goal is construction of information integration in order to support actions in the war on drugs. In addition, this partnership will allow a substantial improvement in logistics of repressive operations against drug trafficking due to the involvement of Military Commands, given the capillarity of military organizations especially in which access is difficult.¹²⁷ Therefore, the current situation shows that there is little utilization of the considerable potential of joint action of various agencies in the war on drugs in the border region, particularly the Armed Forces, and more specifically the Army.

Legal Framework

In order to better understand the legality of the attributions held by the Brazilian Armed Forces, particularly the Brazilian Army, it will be relevant to analyze the judicial framework which the Federal Force is subject to. Beginning with the Brazilian Federal Constitution, Article 142 points out that the employment of the Brazilian Armed Forces “to defend the homeland, the guarantee of the constitutional powers and, at the initiative of any of these, preservation of law

¹²⁵Brazilian Presidency of Republic, “Decreto N 4.200 de 17 de Abril de 2002,” Planalto.gov.br, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/D4200.htm (accessed 11 October 2012).

¹²⁶Brazilian Audit Office, Section 3.5 , 36.

¹²⁷Brazilian Audit Office , Section 4.1, 37.

and order.”¹²⁸ The use of the Brazilian Army in combating narco-trafficking activity led chiefly by the FARC in the border region can be understood as a defense of the motherland. The Army seeks to keep the country away from a threat to Brazilian society (consumption of drugs) and the maintenance of the integrity of national territory, sometimes used by Colombian guerrillas as areas of concealment, sanctuary, training, recruitment or resupply.

Federal Constitution also highlights the objectives of the Brazilian National Defense Policy, which in turn are directed towards the strategic and regional environment.¹²⁹ In this regard, they include Brazil’s strategic arch (the South Atlantic portion encompassing the Southern Cone and Africa), its productive population centers, its vast and rich resource in the northern region (Amazonia), and its leadership in South America’s community of nations.¹³⁰ These objectives are:

1. warranty of sovereignty, national patrimony, and territorial integrity;
2. defense of national interests and people, goods, and Brazilian resources overseas;
3. contribution for preservation of the cohesion and national unity;
4. promotion of regional stability;
5. contribution for the maintenance of peace and international security; and

¹²⁸Brazilian Presidency of Republic, “Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988,” Planalto.gov.br, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm (accessed 16 October 2012).

¹²⁹Brazilian Presidency of Republic, “Decreto N 5.484 de 30 de Junho de 2005,” Planalto.gov.br, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Decreto/D5484.htm (accessed 16 October 2012), Section 3.5.

¹³⁰Brazilian Presidency of Republic, “Decreto N 5.484 de 30 de Junho de 2005,” Section 4.4.

6. projection of Brazil in the concert of nations and its broader insertion into the international decision making processes.¹³¹

Federal Constitution primarily directs the National Defense Policy for Brazil and is built around two central pillars: active diplomacy (peaceful resolution of conflict) and conventional deterrence.¹³² It is clear that military force will only be used in self-defense.

Brazilian National Defense Strategy (NDS) establishes concepts that address the short, medium, and long-term requirements of the nation's security, particularly related to the Amazon, the South Atlantic, and transnational threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, money laundering, refugee flows, environmental degradation, and political and religious radicalism.¹³³ Those unconventional threats require a great level of cooperation with law enforcement, intelligence, and other national government agencies. This interagency cooperation involves international dimensions as well as intelligence issues. In order to face these threats and drive all efforts needed to keep them away from Brazil, the NDS issues high priorities to the Amazon region. Those priorities are related to greater concentration of military units, development of military logistical capacity, and strength of mobility and surveillance.¹³⁴ The NDS points out a new concept of selective presence for Amazon region.¹³⁵

¹³¹Ibid., Section 5.

¹³²Ibid., Section 6.2.

¹³³Brazilian Presidency of Republic, "Decreto N 6.703 de 18 de Dezembro de 2008," Planalto.gov.br, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2008/Decreto/D6703.htm (accessed 16 October 2012).

¹³⁴Brazilian Presidency of Republic, "Decreto N 6.703 de 18 de Dezembro de 2008," Section 10.

¹³⁵Ibid., Section 11.

Complementary Law No. 97/99 provides two forms of Armed Forces' performance in combating cross-border and environmental crimes: preventive and repressive. The law places the Army as the concretizing agent of public policy and prevention of cross-border and environmental crimes. Examples of such offenses are smuggling and international drug, weapons, and wildlife trafficking.¹³⁶

Ostensive patrolling has two dimensions. Preventive ostensive patrolling takes place in periods of normality through anticipatory actions, which aim to prevent crime and anticipate the breakdown of order. Preventive ostensive patrolling covers inspection and enforcement actions, which may be caused or carried out ex-officio. Repressive ostensive patrolling occurs in abnormal situations when there is public nuisance and breach of the legal system. It is therefore a repressive and punitive procedure after the disturbance, or consummation of illicit transgression.¹³⁷

Article 17 A of the mentioned Complementary Law along with the Complementary Law No. 117/2004, expressly state that the activity of prevention and repression of crime will be performed by running, among others, the following actions:

- I. patrolling
- II. inspection of people, land vehicles, ships and aircraft, and
- III - arrests in flagrant delicto.¹³⁸

¹³⁶Brazilian Presidency of Republic, "Lei Complementar N 97 de 9 de Junho de 1999," Planalto.gov.br, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/Lcp97.htm (accessed 26 September 26, 2012).

¹³⁷Angela M. Taveira, "O Poder de Policia dos Membros das Forcas Armadas" (Master's thesis, Escola Superior de Guerra, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2011), 40.

¹³⁸Brazilian Presidency of Republic, "Lei Complementar N 117 de 2 de Setembro de 2004," Planalto.gov.br http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/Lcp117.htm#art2 (accessed 26 September 2012).

Patrolling is an organized employment of the Land Force to carry out preventive and repressive actions against illicit activities.¹³⁹ In the border region, the Army employment may be isolated or in coordination with other agencies of the Executive Branch. To this end, the military units in this region abide by the following conditions:

1. As an agent of cooperation, they provide logistical support, intelligence, communications (command and control), and education (training) to the Federal Police and other agencies that need it.
2. As an agent of prevention, it conducts ostensive policing, patrolling, and inspection of people, vehicles, vessels, and aircrafts.
3. As an agent of repression, performs direct measures to combat crime, makes use of force and immediate confrontation, takes care of preserving the crime scene, performs the collection of objects, instruments, and products for further regularization of crime and arrests in flagrant delicto.¹⁴⁰

Item IV of this same article mentions the Army's authority to act as security police in preventing and combating cross-border and environmental crime in a zone 150 km. away from the border, portion named border belt. This attitude would be only required when there would be no security forces in the area. Thus the Army alternatively assumed the Federal Police's responsibility such as the obligation to prevent and repress these crimes. Any action of the federal military should be reported to the Federal Police, which bears the role of judiciary police. In 2010, a complementary law revoked this item driving the Army to a judicially difficult situation.

¹³⁹Paulo Kuhlmann, "Mudança de Estrutura de Defesa do Exército Brasileiro (1985-2007)." http://www.brasa.org/_sitemason/files/e91TVK/Kuhlmann%20Paulo.pdf (accessed 6 November 2012).

¹⁴⁰This kind of training is provided through the Jungle Warfare Training Center, located in the city of Manaus. This training consists of preparation to support the hostile environment of jungle during protracted operations carried out by Federal Police.

At the same time, it put the law in opposition to the reality, since the Federal Police's long desire is increasingly better integrate with the Army.¹⁴¹

In May 2011, in order to fill the void left by the revoked article of Complementary Law 117, Armed Forces' representatives proposed to federal deputies of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission in Brasilia the creation of ENAFRON (National Strategy for Borders). The ENAFRON concept is to greatly enhance the presence of the Armed Forces and the Federal Police over the nearly 17,000 km. of borders, 7,000 of those being dry lines. ENAFRON intends to implement improvements in the monitoring of the Amazon through land and air patrols on 9,523 km. of rivers and canals that separate the country from its neighbors. The government objective is to curb crimes in border areas and integrate actions between Armed Forces and Federal Police.

With the modernization of the air defense and air traffic control in Brazil through SIVAM and indicating a great expression of that work, it was shown that small aircrafts pose the main entry of illicit drugs in Brazil, which come from known regions producers of these substances.¹⁴² These aircrafts go into the hinterland (domestic consumption) or to neighboring countries on the way to Europe and the U.S., among other destinations.

However, due to lack of regulation of the Law of Destruction Shot, created in 2003 to prevent these kinds of flights, aircraft interception by the Brazilian Air Force responsible for policing the airspace was being ignored by pilots in clandestine flight.¹⁴³ Orders for the

¹⁴¹Brazilian Presidency of Republic, "Lei Complementar N 136 de 25 de Agosto de 2010," Planalto.gov.br, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LCP/Lcp136.htm#art4 (accessed 16 October 2012).

¹⁴²Ricardo Galhardo, "PF na rota das FARC na selva," Abin.gov.br, <http://www.abin.gov.br/modules/articles/article.php?id=2191> (accessed 16 October 2012).

¹⁴³Brazilian Presidency of Republic, "Lei N 7.565 de 19 de Dezembro de 1986," Planalto.gov.br, https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L7565.htm (accessed 16 October 2012).

identification and landing in determined airfield which are required by law, were usually disobeyed.¹⁴⁴ In many situations, despite having heard a warning shot, there was complete disregard to pilot's orders, resulting in a situation similar to "resisting to arrest."¹⁴⁵ Taking more effective action to combat these illegal flights transporting drugs to Brazilian territory became required attitude from the State. Therefore, regulations were enforced as an essential measure for combating crime linked to international drug trafficking.

Regulation of the Law of Destruction Shot created adequate deterrence instruments for policing the Brazilian airspace. The text is the result of a series of exchanges with neighboring countries that occurred to integrate air intercept procedures, and then minimize risk of a misunderstanding. The issue was discussed with other governments interested in it.

In April 2004, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry investigation on arms trafficking concluded that the law previously cited had caused prioritization of land transportation for arms trafficking in Brazil.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, it increased use of ground transportation in the first 100 km. of border since the international air routes were now supervised more closely.¹⁴⁷

2012).

¹⁴⁴Licio Caetano do Rego Monerio, "O curto voo da Lei do Abate," Tempopresente.org, http://www.tempopresente.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4286:o-curto-voo-da-lei-do-abate&catid=36&Itemid=127 (accessed 16 October 2012).

¹⁴⁵Centro de Comunicação da Aeronáutica, "Entenda a Lei do Abate," Reservaer.com.br, <http://www.reservaer.com.br/legislacao/leidoabate/entenda-leidoabate.htm> (accessed 16 October 2012).

¹⁴⁶ABr, "Lei do Abate reduz voos irregulares em 32%," Correio do Brasil.com.br, <http://correiodobrasil.com.br/lei-do-abate-reduz-voos-irregulares-em-32/72455/#.UGY2r471wTE> (accessed 16 October 2012).

¹⁴⁷Mario Hugo Monken, "Lei do Abate muda rota do tráfico de armas," Folha.uol.com.br, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u109720.shtml> (accessed 16 October 2012).

Reactions to Terrorist Threat

Even with some delay Brazil has taken some measures to face the terrorist threat within Brazilian territory. On the strategic level, the Office of Institutional Security, part of the Presidency of Republic, has in its organizational structure the core of Coordination Center of Prevention of and Combating Terrorism Activities. Created by Law 22 of 9 June 2009, it has the following attributions:

I - follow up matters pertaining to international terrorism and actions for its prevention and neutralization; II - promote studies, meetings and other initiatives to broaden the strategic knowledge about the phenomenon of terrorism and related crimes, as well as on policies, strategies, programs, and activities to prevent and combat terrorism; III - participate and receive subsidies for the development of risk assessment of the terrorist threat.¹⁴⁸

In 2008, within the organizational structure of Brazilian System of Intelligence, the Brazilian Agency of Intelligence created the Department of Counterterrorism. This Department is responsible for planning the implementation of prevention activities for terrorist actions in the country, as well as getting information and generating knowledge about such activities. It is also responsible for planning, monitoring, mentoring, and performing the collection and analysis of data and information on terrorist organizations.¹⁴⁹

Under the Ministry of Defense, terrorism is contained within the main documents guiding policy, strategy, and defense doctrine of the country. Among these documents are the National Defense Policy, the Defense Military Policy and the National Defense Strategy, all considering contemporary terrorism as a new threat to states and requiring the Brazilian Armed Forces to be

¹⁴⁸Brazilian Presidency of Republic, Portaria Nr 22, “Núcleo do Centro de Coordenação das Atividades de Prevenção e Combate ao Terrorismo,” 9 June 2009, <http://pbrasil.wordpress.com/2009/06/11/criado-o-nucleo-do-centro-de-coordenacao-das-atividades-de-prevencao-e-combate-ao-terrorismo/> (accessed 20 February 2013).

¹⁴⁹Brazilian Presidency of Republic, “Decreto No 6408, de 24 de Março de 2008,” Planalto.gov.br, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2008/Decreto/D6408.htm (accessed 11 January 2013).

prepared to contribute to preventing and combat terrorist actions.¹⁵⁰ In the operational level, the military services (Navy, Army, and Air Force) are primarily incurred the effective actions of counterterrorism. At the tactical level, the three forces have specialized troops, able to carry out actions against terror, all included in the list of special operations troops, highlighting the Army Special Operations Brigade, unique in Latin America.¹⁵¹ Despite whether or not the likelihood of terrorist acts in Brazil exists, the country is creating a structure to face this threat with the main focus on the FARC and Hezbollah.

CONCLUSION

The first conclusion is that the FARC is an organization that has evolved throughout time to adapt to a new context. In this evolution, the terrorist group has extended its capacity of influence outside Colombian territory. As a regional economic power, Brazil has become the main target of FARC's new focus. The confusing, ambiguous discourse of some Brazilian politicians has opened room for FARC's voice in the midst of Brazilian society. The indisputable fact is that, for some time, the FARC have no longer been characterized as a typical Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organization, but have assumed a new role, that is to become the most powerful organized criminal organization in the Western Hemisphere. This organization participates in the highest production of refined cocaine in the world, in all its stages, from planting the coca leaf to the clandestine distribution to major consumer markets. They continue to routinely apply tactics, techniques and typical terrorist procedures, both selective and indiscriminate, which actually characterizes them as a standard narcoterrorist organization.

¹⁵⁰Fabio El-Amme Paranhos, "A Ameaça do Terrorismo Contemporâneo para a América do Sul: Desafios para o Brasil," (Master's thesis, Brazilian Staff College, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2010), 137.

¹⁵¹Paranhos, 138.

Interestingly, both the Colombian crisis and the Plan Colombia helped the Brazilian military to redesign its mission. Actually, the increasing capacity of the Colombian government to curb guerrilla prompted the Brazilian military to consider the prospects of that internal conflict spilling over Brazilian borders. As a result, the Army promoted a rapid relocation of military units from Southern Brazil to the Amazon region while the Air Force, responsible for SIVAM, could justify its sophisticated radar system under an entirely distinct strategic rationale. Brazilian authorities even mentioned the prospects of sharing information gathered by SIVAM with neighboring countries. However, effective moves towards these objectives have not yet been completed.

There is a clear correlation between perceived threats and the type of participation in international policy that a country seeks. These objectives define the movements that this state will execute in international relations as well as the level of interference and degree of problems that it is willing to bear. Brazil, a country with growing projection onto the international scene and aiming for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, begins to make strides to do justice to the focus that it has received internationally. Change in the priority of defense from south to the Amazon region is closely connected to the operational level. National Defense Policy provides this recommendation. Under current priority new threats are perceived and consequently, new ways to "fight them." This is unlike the Cold War period when the priority for defense was in south and there was a defined interstate enemy, demanding arming and preparation to face a showdown. In the Amazon, gaps are minimized with the geographical idea of colonizing the region with the intention of integrating natives and adapting them to current life. This socialization will help to keep them away from the influence of illicit activities such as FARC'S collaborators. One adds to this the issues of border control (smuggling of weapons, drugs, lumber, among others) and clashes with FARC's guerrillas. Therefore, only the Amazon collects both the new threats and the old ones in one place.

Success of the Law of Destruction Shot led the drug traffickers to change from aerial routes to land routes increasing the need for a better performance of the Brazilian Army. To achieve greater results one must act upon the main point of entry used for drugs that are coming into the country. This way to face the problem will help with the internal security control within the Brazilian cities, especially the major centers.

Performance of intelligence services must be more focused on the connections between political discourse with a milder voice in relation to the FARC and its possible connections with the narcoterrorist group. Related to the Army, there should be concern with who is in charge of political decisions which may directly impact financing of projects related to Amazon security as well as the level of openness and sensibility to FARC's discourse.

Integration with the Federal Police in the border region is more than a possibility, it is a necessity of the Brazilian society, which perceives no distinction between the various branches of public service that should provide security. The Brazilian Army will need to keep an open-mind to new input from interagencies that are more experienced in some kinds of operations.

Investments in new technologies will bring good results even in the short term. To achieve an effective, lasting result Brazil should continue to heavily invest in modern equipment to monitor the borders. As an extension of public power in the region, the Army must expand its strategy of selective presence in the deployment of new border platoons. The new Project of Transformation has pointed out the way for a successful implementation of this approach.

The region of TBA deserves special attention due to increasingly intense economic activity and integration between members of the FARC and Hezbollah, in accordance with Brazilian intelligence reports. Recent Brazilian economic growth and its exposure in the international arena due to host the Football World Cup in 2014 and Olympic Games in 2016 requires that precautions be taken. This means that preventive actions must be taken against terrorist actions in the national territory, particularly at these two important sporting events.

Parallely to the drug trade, the FARC control a considerable slice of the smuggling of illegal weapons and ammunition, activities that directly affect Brazil through different connections. These activities result in serious repercussions such as disrupting law and order public security of large urban centers.

Finally, the primary question that led this entire work can be answered. The FARC actually personify a real, current threat to Brazil. Even with some delay, the Brazilian government has taken measures to delineate a political end state that seeks to place its instruments of national power in appropriate position to face this new environment. In this context, the Brazilian Army has an important role to play in the operational level. These measures bring about a wide, clear comprehension by the Army about the national policy for Amazon security with consequences for the entire Brazilian society. The way is not an easy one. Restraints such as a reduced budget, the political penchant of some politicians who are suspected of being unreliable, and internal resistance to change are all challenges which must be overcome. To preserve Brazilian Permanent National Objectives is essential to strengthen state institutions, especially the armed forces. In this regard, the Brazilian Army was designated as the most important instrument of military national power with clear political end state, desired effects, and short and medium term objectives to achieve unity of action among all the stakeholders in Brazil.

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